But N is not defending at least, not here a biological view. Conscience is the awareness by the free man of his will power and his "dominating instinct" the drive of will to power. There can be no doubt: In human beings there is so much that is terrible! Here the pertinent issue is that the person who makes a promise has to have a memory created for him, so that precisely at this point, we can surmise, there exists a site for what is hard, cruel, and painful.
People might be more justified in asserting the opposite Popular wisdom says "Injury makes people prudent," but to the extent that it makes them prudent it also makes them bad. No matter how well we have understood the usefulness of some physiological organ or other or a legal institution, a social custom, a political practice, some style in art or in religious cultswe have not, in that process, grasped anything about its origin—no matter how uncomfortable and unpleasant this may sound in elderly ears.
Many notable modern English translations exist, and scholars generally regard the German-language version of On the Genealogy of Morals by Italian editors Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari to be the standard German edition of the work.
Before we turn to those, let me point out something useful that Heidegger in his lectures on Nietzsche observes, and that may be helpful if you read more Nietzsche. In order to give at least an idea of how uncertain, how belated, how accidental "the meaning" of punishment is and how one and the same procedure can be used, interpreted, or adjusted for fundamentally different purposes, let me offer here an example which presented itself to me on the basis of relatively small and random material: If that is the sum of his value theory, then we might say that he has rejected foundationalism about purpose -- or, instead, we might say he has accepted it, concluded there is no foundation, and so offered in its stead something similar to but distinct from traditional, foundationalist value theory.
Such morality is sharply differentiated from Christian or other "ascetic" moralities. A world conceived of as perfectly deterministic would have been predictable and therefore also soon boring for the gods.
At the end of the previous section I even talked as if there was no such thing as this moralizing and thus as if now these ideas had necessarily come to an end after the collapse of their presuppositions, the faith in our "creditor," in God.
This is not an endorsement of his view, but rather a shorthand way to avoid having to write "Nietzsche says The entire section is 1, words. But consider what that presupposes! Christianity is the morality of the slave: As yet, every "true" philosopher has retained the trappings of the ascetic priest; his slogans have been "poverty, chastity, humility.
This makes me suspicious of those who want to make Nietzsche seem nicer than he sounds. But N denies this, and wants to assert an alternative. Here N precedes Freud, and it is not hard to see why Freud greatly respected N: Imagine that this universe is all there is, and that it repeats itself endlessly: Basically it is the same active force which is at work on a grander scale in those artists of power and organization and which builds states.
The compensation thus consist of a permission for and right to cruelty. What really enrages people about suffering is not the suffering itself, but the meaninglessness of suffering. In other words, morality is viewed not as an unassailable, static set of facts or as an ideal realm of transcendental essences.
Perhaps our word "man" [Mensch] manas continues to express directly something of this feeling of the self: This powerful instinct for freedom, once made latent we already understand howthis instinct driven back, repressed, imprisoned inside, and finally able to discharge and direct itself only against itself—that and that alone is what bad conscience is in its beginnings.
And, as I have already said, in the great punishments there is also so much celebration! Now, in a fit of pessimism, the prospect of a final installment must once and for all be denied. The wrong doer is no longer "left without peace" and thrown out, and the common anger can no longer vent itself on him without restraint to the same extent it did before.
Consequently, the "development" of a thing, a practice, or an organ has nothing to do with its progress towards a single goal, even less is it the logical and shortest progress reached with the least expenditure of power and resources, but rather the sequence of more or less profound, more or less mutually independent processes of overpowering which take place on that thing, together with the resistance which arises against that overpowering each time, the transformations of form which have been attempted for the purpose of defence and reaction, the results of successful countermeasures.
Those who are moved by it are slaves -- those who made it, manipulators grasping for power. Punishment is supposed to be valuable in waking a feeling of guilt in the guilty party. Up to this point I have deliberately set aside the actual moralizing of these ideas the repression of them into the conscience, or more precisely, the complex interaction between a bad conscience and the idea of god.
So what, then, had happened to the morsus conscientiae? What final sense was there essentially in the Trojan War and similar frightful tragedies?
The wronged person gets to enjoy the pleasure of being cruel, arising from the pleasure of being for a short while, perhaps of seeming higher status than the sufferer.Friedrich Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, published late in his career, demonstrates the philosopher’s academic roots in nineteenth century classical philology.
Divided into three. On the Genealogy of Morals Second Essay Guilt, Bad Conscience and Related Matters At the end of the previous section I even talked as if there was no such thing as this moralizing and thus as if now these ideas had necessarily come to an end after the collapse of their presuppositions, the faith in our "creditor," in God.
All the Interesting People are Missing in Heaven – Biography of Friedrich Nietzsche. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche born on October 15, in Röcken bei Lützen, Prussian Saxony he was a German philosopher most credited for his brash criticism about religion and the role in played in society and mortality.
In the second essay, Nietzsche. The second essay of Nietzsche's "polemic," On the Genealogy of Morals, is a rich and elusive piece, full of valuable hints and suggestions, but difficult finally to pin down.
The essays that flank it are, in their own ways, more straightforward, and have attracted the lion's share of critical. Nov 07, · The Second Essay of Nietzsche In section 4 of the second essay, Nietzsche Section 12 of essay 2 might be enlisted for Nietzsche: Genealogy of Morals: First Essay First Essay Good and Evil, whereas the second is the original, At this point I won x27;t suppress a sigh and a final hope.
SparkNotes: Genealogy of Morals: Second Essay, Sections Nietzsche opens the second essay by examining the significance of our ability nbsp; SparkNotes: Genealogy of Morals: Second Essay, SectionsSections in Friedrich Nietzsche 39;s Genealogy of Morals.Download